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Introduction 
In the following thesis I am going to present some events in the business world that 
changed the way several jurisdictions approach to inappropriate behaviors in corporate 
governance.  
The critical eye is going to focus on the human behavior at the beginning of the most 
significant business failures in the last decades that sapped the public opinion, and 
forced the governments to adopt new codes and more restricted patterns of control.  
Historically each company’s collapse has driven to relevant law developments. Think 
to the Sorbanes- Oxley Act in 2002, as reaction to the Enron’s scandal.   Nonetheless 
human beings have always found a way to elude the rules, damaging the weakest 
counterpart, making History repeats. 
The “bad” behavior can take place because of the information asymmetry. The whole 
challenge is played on the mitigation of the principal-agent problem. 
The latest mitigation theories appeal to two different aspects: the ethical behavior of 
the human factor, and a more restricted and interactive control system, based on 
transparency, in business realities.  
Even more restricted is the control system where the principal represents a relevant 
portion of the society, think to the American public companies or to the Italian società 
per azioni (S.p.a.).  
For the analysis I consider the study of several relevant contexts. 
A context refers to all the features and variables existing in a certain social 
environment. In my point of view we could reassume everything in one word: culture.  
Culture influences the way people make decisions. If we have a clear view of the 
context, we can better understand the bonds between the actors within society.  
Accordingly to an interesting new current the traditional pay-off between opportunity 
cost and the mere profit is shaping in something more complex (and maybe more 
complete). Social variables influence the way to do business. Corporate social 
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responsibility and ethic finance are known concepts to entrepreneurs, managers and 
stakeholders.  
Stakeholders mean all the subjects who interact with our business, directly and 
indirectly, such as banks, employees, costumers, government, local institutions and 
public opinion. Stakeholders are identified by their interest in the affairs of the 
corporation and that the interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value. Businesses 
need stakeholders’ approval to thrive. There are virtuous links with all of the actors, 
where everyone tries to obtain value from each cont(r)act.  
Companies try to build a better reputation, that helps them to achieve the expected 
return. Ethic finance contemplate to invest in companies who adopt ethical codes and 
spend resources for social purposes. Therefore in some markets companies have a 
concrete incentive to follow a social development path, no fading the economic reason.  
 
 
“A great business is too big to be human” (Henry Ford) 
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Chapter 1 – Business scandals 
In Western countries, recent scandals involving fraudulent accounting practices have 
aroused the public indignation. Real costs and debts have been hidden through creative 
and unethical accounting practices by Enron, Worldcom, Conseco, Parmalat and other 
dozens of public companies’ unscrupulous executives. Accounting tricks such as 
recognizing fictitious revenues, capitalizing operating expenses on balance sheet and 
manipulating bills were their way to do business. 
Enron scandal 
2001 December 2nd , USA woke up in another nightmare after the World Trade Center 
attacks happened less than two months earlier. The Enron’s record crack. The Texas-
based energy-trading giant, declared bankruptcy. After SEC discovered a colossal 
accounting fraud lasted for years, Enron felt in 2 months. It was a company with 
20,000 employees and revenues for 101 billion dollars. 1 
Enron began from nothing, and in 15 years became the seventh biggest American 
company, settled in 40 countries. That was possible thanks to the freedom of 
commodities trading, overall after the National Energy policy act of 1992, that allowed  
the energy price paid by utilities to fluctuate. 2 At one point, the company offered more 
than 1,800 different contracts for several product categories, ranging from oil and 
natural gas to weather derivatives, broadband services, and emissions rights, and it 
earned 90% of its revenues from trading derivatives. And unlike traditional commodity 
and futures exchanges and brokers, Enron’s derivative business was not subject to 
federal regulations3. The “virtual” assets were accounted for the 80% of the whole 
business.  
The house of cards began to lose stability during the Californian energy crisis, that 
made drop the value of the energy futures in Enron’s assets stomach. Andersen, the 
Enron audit company since its birth in 1983, in January 2001 discussed about dropping 
                                                          
1 “La madre di tutte le truffe” Il sole24ore 2013 - http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-12-02/la-
madre-tutte-truffe-contabili-scandalo-enron-12-anni-dopo-213603.shtml?uuid=AB9PkRh 
2“Enron’s Power play” BusinessWeek 2001 http://www.businessweek.com/2001/01_07/b3719001.htm 
3 “Fundamental of Investing” – Smart, Gitman, Joehnk 12th edition page 582 
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Enron as a client, and then in October announced that some off-balance sheet losses 
and debts would have been announced.  The announcement was terrifying,  $1.2 
billion decrease in company value. After the scandalous news, during the 
investigation, Andersen admitted an error of judgment in the valuation process of 
Enron’s debt. That meant an overstatement of profits by almost $600m over the years 
1997-2000.4 Looking to the role of the main characters of this sad business event, 
leaving out for a moment the mere financial fraud, the fact that had the most 
controversial repercussion on the public opinion was the Kenneth Lay(Enron’s CEO 
and founder) unmoved reaction to the Vice President of Corporate development 
Sherron Watkins’ letter about some irregularities in some financial reports. The former 
CEO Jeffrey Skilling left few weeks the Watkins’ letter. Therefore Lay, conscious of 
the imminent disaster decided to omit the fact to Enron’s employees and afterwards 
fostering them to invest their savings funds in the company. While the employees were 
unaware about the consequences of that action, Lay sold 93,000 shares and earned 
about $2 M.  
The mass media highlighted some disquieting aspects of the story. In fact Enron was 
one of the more active participant to the Washington game of money- politics. 
Between 1990 and 2002, the company or its managers gave $5.9m in political 
contributions, Seventy-one of the 100 senators received Enron largesse; they included 
19 of the 23 members of the energy committee, which was investigating the firm's 
collapse.5 
The following graphic shows the Enron’s down fall in 2001.6 
                                                          
4 “The real scandal” The Economist 2002 http://www.economist.com/node/940091 
5 “Four committees in search of a scandal” The Economist http://www.economist.com/node/940913 
6 http://content.time.com/time/interactive/0,31813,2013797,00.html 
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As information trickles out and the finger pointing begins, it’s clear that many people 
involved had spotted warning signs of Enron’s accounting malfeasance long before the 
company’s collapse. 
The scandal led the USA Government to issue the Sorbanes-Oxley act, the first anti-
fraud law of the 21st Century. The Sorbanes-Oxley act claims that the responsibility for 
accounting matters is on the firm’s top executives and any violation shall be worsen 
punished.7 We are going to give a brief overlook at the Sarbanes-Oxley act  in the next 
chapter. 
With no doubt an Enron case happened in Italy under a different name. Parmalat. 
 
 
                                                          
7   “La madre di tutte le truffe” Il sole24ore 2013 - http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-12-02/la-
madre-tutte-truffe-contabili-scandalo-enron-12-anni-dopo-213603.shtml?uuid=AB9PkRh 
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PARMALAT FRAUD 
Pre- scandal Parmalat was a huge multinational company with 213 subsidiaries in 30 
several countries all over the world. Parmalat’s business included dairy products and 
bakery.  
Parmalat born at the beginning of the 60’s at Collecchio (Parma),founded by the Tanzi 
family. The expansion began in the late 70’s and the 80’s. It was possible thank to new 
technologies in conservation, Uht, and a new packaging, tetrapack.8 
The expansion passed by the acquisitions in all the continents, the more important 
were the acquisition in 1997 of the Canadian company Beatrice food for $140mln, in 
1998 Ault food for $250mln, the South African Bonnita Holdings for $100m and the 
Australian Pauls for $220m. This dizzy growth gave an international profile to the 
Italian company, but on the other hand it made possible to the Tanzi’s family and to 
the executives to move funds easily from a place to another. The well-known off-shore 
companies. One of those companies would have captured the mass media attention 
after the scandal was found out, Bonlat, a subsidiary settled in the Cayman Islands.  
Another important step in Parmalat History was the listing on Milano Stock exchange 
in 1994.Moreover Calisto Tanzi, the president and the founder of the company, 
through Parmalat Finanziaria owned the “Parma Football Club”. 
All the financial operations were possible mainly thank the debt granted by several 
lending institutions and  32 bond loans for the amount of $7B. 9 
Parmalat justified the continuous loans recourse, as the need to be ready to respond to 
eventually development opportunities offered by the market.  
Parmalat’s industrial and financial reputation was strong, and it boasted of a good 
social image too, earned by several donations for the restoration and promotion of the 
home territory.  
                                                          
8“Managerial irresponsibility and firm survival. Pivoting the company in the aftermath of a social scandal”- 
Arabella Mocciaro Li Destri, pag. 93 
9 “Il caso Parmalat” Dott.essa Maria Katia Di Staso 2004 
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The first signals of the financial instability (visible for the outsiders) were shown in 
February 2003, when Parmalat appealed to the investors for another bond issue for 
€300mln. The market did not react well. Parmalat’s shares registered a -9%, attributed 
to the insufficient clearness in the company communication with the stakeholders. Mr. 
Tanzi labeled the operation as a mistake, he revoked the bond issue and removed his 
CFO Fausto Tonna. 
In March 2003 the Consob (the institute of market control) began to ask to Parmalat 
for more information about the financial company situation. In particular Consob 
doubted about the possibility for Parmalat to pay back the bond loan expiring in 2004. 
Tanzi responded that the debt would be covered with company’s liquidity. The balance 
of 2002, approved in March 2003 shown $4B deposited at Bank of America, and the 
participation, which can be liquidated easily, for almost $600mln in Epicurum, an 
investment fund based in the Cayman Islands. 10 
Parmalat tried to find useless resources through new bond issue, respectively of 
€300mln in June, entirely bought by Nextra (Intesa), and €350mln in September 
subscribed by Deutsche Bank, postponing the final showdown until Nobember. 
Deloitte & Touche claimed the investment in Epicurum was not safe; suspect that 
became fact in December. The 19th of December Bank of America notified to 
Thornton (auditor company) about the inexistence of relations with the Parmalat 
Group, and warned that the deposit paper owned by Parmalat was a fake.1112 From this 
point the Colecchio’s company attracted control agencies and mass media attention.  
Some of the events happened in the past were interpreted with different keys, and  
magistrates began to ask the question worth millions of euro: Did someone actually 
knows? 
The evidences that could have been made people aware about the financial wobbly 
Parmalat situation were several. For example the Parmatour foundation at the 
                                                          
10“Crack Parmalat” http://it.ibtimes.com/crack-parmalat-storia-di-una-truffa-colossale-1315179 
11 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/fc?cmd=anteprima&codid=22.0.1587055814 
12“Cronologia di un crac” – La Repubblica http://temi.repubblica.it/repubblicaparma-
ilcasoparmalat/2008/03/31/tutte-le-tappe-del-crac/ 
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beginning of 2003. Parmatour was born on the ashes of Tanzi’s touristic activities. 
Already in 2004 Mr. Callisto Tanzi admitted money distraction from the Parmalat 
group to Parmatour, ,in which Mrs. Francesca Tanzi (Callisto’s daughter) was part of 
the board, for millions of euro. 
Parmatour was the sum of different touristic assets belonged before to Hit Spa. Hit 
Spa’s financial papers were catastrophic. At the end of 2001 the losses were more than 
€ 80M, and the patrimonial balance was heavily negative. That was just a picture of 
the wider scenario; the due debts to banks were about € 330M, with a real estate 
patrimony of just € 150M.13 In the Hit balance sheets shown unclear intragroup 
operations for hundreds of millions. Moreover the debt castle was guaranteed 
primarily by personal suretyships. It meant that if Hit spa had not been able of 
repaying the debts, the banks should have recouped their credits on Tanzi’s personal 
patrimony, composed mainly of the majority of Parmalat shares. It made banks 
virtually the Parmalat Group owners. Therefore the creditors committee, composed of 
several important credit institutions such as Medio Credito Centrale, Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena and Banca Intesa, who were owed an amount of € 500M,  decided to draft a 
restructuration plan. In 2003 Tanzi signed the plan to save his touristic ill empire, with 
the endorsement of 38 banks. That was substantially the birth of Parmatour, in which 
every asset, before belonged to Hit Spa, flowed in. The plan envisages subsiding the 
liabilities of €310M, also through a new social capital underwriting of € 101M. The 
money flow should had been dispensed in three tranches. Unfortunately, only after a 
couple of months, Parmatour’ CEO, Roberto Tedesco asked more money to banks. 
Later, it was found out that some of the Parmalat’s liabilities were drown into 
Parmatour, and the resources that should had been used for Parmatour restructuration, 
were instead used for Tanzi’s debts. 
The long process that followed the Parmalat crack caused heavy punishments for the 
main characters, such as Tanzi and Tonna, but at the same time it found out new and 
more complex scenarios where the auditors and the authorities could had understood 
the fraud before it changed forever the oblivious shareholders’ lives.  
                                                          
13 “Parmatour, l’inchiesta è alla svolta” 7 Gennaio 2004 – Il Sole24ore 
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Fausto Tonna during the process said to the officials that, even if the balance contained 
wrong data and fake documents, the expertise of some of the stakeholders such as 
banks or auditors should had driven them to find out the misdemeanor. 14 
Parmalat scandal began a case of study, and such as Enron facts, inspired a new deal of 
law enforcement in the whole western community. 
The outrage involving the milk company drove the Italian Government to consider a 
new case, in which big companies in crisis threated to involve in the collapse such a 
big amount of interests and people never been before in Europe. The law enforcement 
went to implement the insolvency proceedings, passing through the “D.L. n° 347 23rd 
of December 2003” sponsored by the Ministry of Productive businesses titled “Misure 
urgenti per la ristrutturazione industriale di grandi imprese in stato di insolvenza” 
(Urgent measures for insolvent big companies’ industrial restructuration), and few 
months later turned in the ordinary law  “L. 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39” labeled as 
Marzano law.  
The urgent nature of the law  fit with the Government will to protect the creditors, the 
shareholders and the correct market going. 
On the 24th of December 2003 Parmalat Spa and Parmalat Finanziaria Spa(the 
holding) were admitted to the extraordinary management proceeding for big 
companies, accordingly to Marzano law’s disposition, and appointing Enrico Bondi as 
Extraordinary commissioner.15 The most of Parmalat group firms were declared 
insolvent. The recovery plan was not easy to establish, mainly because of the cooked 
books. The CONSOB asked to the court of Parma to nullify the balance sheet of 2002; 
it was justifying with the dearth of redaction criteria enforcement. The main point was 
that the plan could not base on historical real numbers. 
Now we are going to give a brief look to  “L. 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39”, trying to get a 
clear frame of the Italian bankruptcy law. 
                                                          
14 http://it.ibtimes.com/crack-parmalat-storia-di-una-truffa-colossale-1315179 
15 “Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. in Amministrazione Straordinaria Breve Relazione sulla gestione e Situazione 
Economica e Patrimoniale al 31 Dicembre 2003” – BorsaItaliana.it 
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Art.1 sets the numerical criteria that have to be respected. The companies with more 
than 1000 employees in the last year, with total liabilities at least of € 1B. The limits 
were thought as filter, highlighting the special nature of the law.16  
The companies who respect the just  mentioned limits, can ask to the Ministry to be 
admitted to the extraordinary management proceeding, and at the same time it has to 
petition for the status of insolvency to the court. The Ministry, then, nominees the 
extraordinary commissioner. The commissioner, until the formal declaration of 
insolvency, rules the company, managing it with the scope to make the procedure 
clearer. The possibility to involve other group firms into the insolvency proceeding is a 
commissioner’s due, as well as the delivery to the court of the last two balance sheets, 
the list of creditors, financial statements and the list of subjects who claim any right on 
any company asset17, in the maximum term of 60 days.18 
In the next five days, if the court declares the insolvency status, it nominees the judge 
and gives to the creditors the term of 90-120 days to do the application for joining the 
procedure. 
In the case the Ministry does not approve the recovery program signed by the  
commissioner, it can turn the extraordinary management proceeding into bankruptcy.19 
Accordingly to Art.4 bis , added later the D.L.’s conversion, the recovery program can 
dispose the pattern for creditors payback plans. Creditors can be divided by class or 
nature, keeping mandatory the Ministry approval. The recovery program is part of the 
deal (concordato), that has to be approved by the majority of creditors admitted in the 
procedure. 
The crucial next step is the liability valuation, that has to be done quickly. The 
commissioner makes the creditors aware about the valuation. If any creditor disagrees, 
the law gives the possibility to impugn the valuation at least 30 days before the day of 
the judicial hearing.  
                                                          
16 The limits were respectively 500 employees and liabilities for €300M in DL 347 23 Dicembre 2003. 
17 D.lgs 270/99 Amministrazione straordinaria – Art. 5 
18 “L. 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39” – Art. 3 
19 L. 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39” – Art. 4 comm. 4 
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Another countermeasure adopted by Italian Jurisprudence was the signing of L. 262 of 
2005 (ordinary law)20 - labeled “la tutela del risparmio e corporate governance” 
(savings protection and coroporate governance) – concerning the internal control 
offices reorganization for public companies. The restrictions trace the SOX 
dispositions in IC patterns and guidelines. 
 
DIESEL GATE – VOLKSWAGEN 
A study research realized by the West Virginia University's Center for Alternative 
Fuels began in 2013, has found out the latest giants’ sin. More specifically, on 
September 2015, one of the firm leaders in automobile sector, Volkswagen admitted to 
cheat on emission tests in US. According to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), some of the vehicles, with diesel engines, had a particular kind of devise that 
could detect when the car was being tested, reducing the value of the harmful 
emissions.21 Procedures involving the testing of the VW’s engines began in the Old 
Continent too, and the results are not different from the West Virginia University’s 
ones. Sudden the EU reaction came by the German Minister of Transportation, 
Alexander Dobrindt. The latter ensured to drive a clear and exemplar investigation on 
the case, while the Industry Responsible of the European Commission, Elzbieta 
Bienkowska , restated about the EU guide lines of “0 tolerance” on fraud cases and the 
European willingness to make everyone subject to the EU regulation stands resolute.22 
Basically Volkswagen hided, through the use of a particular software, the pollution 
emission of his cars during the tests driven by the several controllers in the countries 
the Volkswagen brand is commercialized. 
                                                          
20 Art. 154 bis T.U.F. 
21 “Il Centro Universitario che ha messo in ginocchio Volkswagen”, Il Sole24Ore, (2015) 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2015-09-24/il-centro-universitario-che-ha-messo-ginocchio-
volkswagen-070948.shtml?uuid=ACO1Ni3 
22 
http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/09/24/news/ad_aprile_la_volkswagen_aveva_avvertito_i_proprieta
ri_californiani_le_auto_a_rischio_test_emissioni_-123551859/ 
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The stock markets reaction did not wait. Volkswagen shares quotation is dropping 
drastically, from 167€ of the 17th of September to 101€ of the 2nd of October, a drop of 
about 35% . The scandal influenced the governance strategy and plan too. The 
Japanese Suzuki Motors, who represented the partner for the developing of new hybrid 
technologies, decided to sell his participation of 1.5% of Volkswagen capital to 
Porsche, later a reflection drop (-3%) on Nikkei Index of his title quotation . 23 
The whole economic aftermaths are not still measurable; as we read before for Enron 
and Parmalat, the wakes can be felt for years. But so far the overview is not rosy. The 
shareholders are preparing to sue the company for 40B€, as a result of the loss of about 
25B€ on the stock market. Moreover Volkswagen should face the sanctions coming 
from several countries, the US one overall.24 The possible amount requested by the US 
Government is still not clear. Until the beginning of the year (2016), the maximum 
expected sanction was about $ 19B, as a response for the 584,000 accused engines 
assembled on as much vehicles on the American roads.25 On the 5th of January 2016, 
with the announce of the American lawsuit26, the numbers were quite different: the 
range of the fine was corrected to $ 45B with a more unrealistic peak that could reach 
$80B. Just think that the fund addressed from Volkswagen for the case was less than 
$7B. While expected, the suit sent Volkswagen shares lower on the next day, trading 
down 4.0% at €121.30 each. 
In the following graph we can notice the dramatic drop of the end of September 2015, 
when the Dieselgate blew up. The drop happened in the first week of 2016 was instead 
the reaction to the just mentioned market reaction to the lawsuit announce.  
                                                          
23 The partnership was in part compromised in 2011. It had to do with a controversy solved with the re-
acquisition of about Suzuki’s 19%. However the Japanese firm still had VW’s 1.5% until September 2015. We 
cannot assert any conclusion, but for sure the selling procedure involving Porsche was trigged by the scandal 
burst. – look to “Suzuki sancisce il divorzio da Wolfsburg” 2015 – Il sole24Ore - 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2015-09-27/suzuki-sancisce-divorzio-wolfsburg-
081103.shtml?uuid=ACpLxc5&fromSearch 
24 “Volkswagen rischia il crack” http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/volkswagen-rischia-crac-1184238.html 
25 Il governo Usa contro Volkswagen, parte una causa da 19 miliardi di dollari” (2016) – Il Sole24ore - 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2016-01-04/il-governo-usa-contro-volkswagen-parte-causa-miliardi-
dollari-192015.shtml?rlabs=1 
26 “The government’s lawsuit alleges that Volkswagen violated the Clean Air Act by making and selling vehicles 
that were designed differently from Volkswagen’s assertions in applications for certification to the EPA and the 
California Air Resources Board.” – “U.S. Sues Volkswagen Over Emissions Scandal” – ‘The Wall Street Journal’ 
Jan 5th 2016 
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The German group is in a difficult situation, in fact it is called to draw a compromise 
with all its victims. European costumers are organizing several class actions (just in 
Germany 60,000 underwriters). In Italy, France and Spain several class actions are 
starting as well, involving the possibility to recall all the tampered car with the 
incriminated software (concerning about 8.5 million vehicles in Europe). They are 
disappointed for the impaired treatment received, compared to the $1,000 and free 
assistance offered by the German giant to the US costumers. In the US, however, the 
calling back plan discussed with the EPA was rejected by the Carb (California Air 
Resources Board) for inadequacy.  
At last but not least, the VW’s financial sources are going to lower. The European 
Investment Bank (EIB) has decided to cut out all the future loans addressed to 
Volkswagen group until the investigations end. 
EIB’s president Werner Hoyer said that if even part of the financings dispensed to VW 
in the last 25 years has been used for developing the tampering plan, he would be very 
embittered. The European Anti-fraud office (Olaf) is verifying if any irregularities 
occurred in the European loans management. 28 
VW has received € 4.5B. It has still to pay back about € 1.9B. 
                                                          
27 Volkswagen shares graphic of the last 6 months (to 01-18-2016) – Yahoo Finance 
28“Maxi class action contro Volkswagen” (2016) – Il Sole24ore - http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2016-
01-15/maxi-class-action-contro-volkswagen-063507.shtml?uuid=AC4eDbAC&fromSearch 
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On the other side, as we have seen in other cases, all the corporate bodies have been 
revolutionized. The first one who paid for the game was the CEO,  Martin Winterkorn 
simultaneously president of the executive committee of “Porsche Automobil Holding”. 
He was replaced by Matthias Mueller who has taken the company’s guide in the most 
difficult time of Volkswagen History. Mueller claimed to build a new pattern, based 
on integrity and laws, for the board of directors. The scenario has completely changed 
for Winterkorn. Only in April 2015 the management board, the supervisory board and 
the main shareholders endorsed the ex-CEO, and guided the resignation of Ferdinand 
Piëch, President of the supervisory board since 2002, but sudden the diesel cheating 
software has been found out, all the shareholders and offices distanced themselves 
from the Winterkorn’s conduct. 
The scandal has influenced every business crease: the governance, finance, brand 
image, shareholders value. It makes the final damage inestimable, but for sure 
colossal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Chapter 2 – Corporate laws and their evolutions 
“Corporate law deals the formation and operations of corporations and is related to 
commercial and contract law. A corporation is a legal entity created through the laws 
of its state of incorporation, treating a corporation as a legal "person" that has standing 
to sue and be sued, distinct from its stockholders.”29  
There are several patterns of corporate laws applied all over the world, but we can 
highlight the main leverages that allow the lawmaker to shape their own codes. The 
key elements are: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated 
management, and investor ownership. Having a definite idea of these elements we can 
better understand what a corporation is. The structural characteristics make the 
corporation uniquely attractive for organizing productive activity, but at the same time 
they generate tensions and tradeoffs between the actors involved within the 
corporation bonds.  
I think we need to introduce briefly some important notions directly dependent by the 
five leverages mentioned above.  
The legal personality involved the assumption of the firm as a “nexus for contracts”; 
in the sense that a firm serves, basically, as the common counterparty in numerous 
contracts with several classes of stakeholders: suppliers, employees, and costumers. 
Legal personality permits a firm to serve a single contracting party that is distinct from 
the various individuals who own or manage the firm. Consequently we must say that 
this is possible because of the “separate patrimony”. It means that the capital 
subscribed by the owners is an available company’s resource. The “entity shielding” 
concept is useful for giving to all the potential firm’s counterparts a guarantee about 
their bonds. Moreover, the conferment  is separated and unavailable for owners and 
their private creditors. This is basically the meaning of the second core characteristic, 
the limited liability. Corporate laws are shaped to allow a certain flexibility in the 
owners configuration, without affect the stability of the ordinary going business. 
Transferable shares is, maybe, the strongest impacted corporations attitude, that 
                                                          
29 http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/corporate-law/ 
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generated a new horizon of networks and new legislative contractual cases, the stock 
markets. Hereby the need of having professional figures to coordinate the resources 
and acting for the firm sake, is what delegated management stands for. The 
management function is dispatched attempting to represent the owners will. The right 
to participate in control – generally involves voting in the election of directors and 
voting to approve the major transactions -  and the right to receive the firm’s residual 
earnings, or profits, are typically proportional to the amount of capital contributed to 
the firm. Through the investor ownership , everyone who show off the status of 
investor can benefit of the already quoted rights.  
Corporate law’s functions are clear, it sets the structure of the corporate form, and it 
attempts to mitigate the conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies, including 
those between corporate insiders, such as controlling shareholders and top managers, 
and outsiders, such as a minority shareholders or creditors. These conflicts are what 
economists call “agency problems” or “principal-agent” problems. 30 The logic that 
stands below a principal-agent problem is that a counterpart has a major degree of 
information than the others . This phenomena is known as “information asymmetry”, 
and it gives to the agent a room of maneuver in which he could behave taking a 
personal advantage, and/or damaging the principal’s interest. The dilemmas we are 
talking about, are known as “adverse selection problem” and the “moral hazard”.   
This means that the value of the agent’s performance owe to the principal will be 
reduced, if moral hazard or adverse selection problem occurred. It could happen 
directly or not. To assure the quality of the agent’s performance, the principal usually 
engages costly monitoring procedures on the agent’s actions. The greater the 
complexity of the tasks undertaken by the agent, the larger these ‘agency costs’ are 
likely to be.31 
After we have taken a look to the fundamentals of corporate law, we can assert that all 
the study cases are directly depended by corporate law efficiency. Parmalat, 
                                                          
30 “The Anatomy of corporate law” – John Armour, H. Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, page 35 
31 “The Anatomy of corporate law” – John Armour, H. Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, page 35 
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WorldCom, Enron and Lehman Brothers scandals have boosted the legislator beyond 
new law borders. Let’s analyze the most important reforms issued in the last decades.  
Our start point is the Sarbanes Oxley Act, for the most considered as the first brick 
toward a new conception of corporate law. 
 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act – Overview and criticisms  
The legislation came into force in 2002 and introduced major changes to the regulation 
of financial practice and corporate governance. Named after Senator Paul Sarbanes 
and Representative Michael Oxley, who were its main architects, it also set a number 
of deadlines for compliance.32 
The Sorbanes-Oxley act is pointed as the most revolutionary law enforcement, in USA 
and maybe in the Western Countries, since the Roosevelt’s “New Deal”. The act 
created a new regulator for the accounting industry: the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board(PCAOB). To address some obvious conflicts of interest, auditors 
were prohibited from doing a variety of non-audit work for clients. Firms had to 
establish independent audit committees, company loans to executives were banned, top 
executives had to certify accounts and whistleblowers were given more job protection 
if they reported any suspicions of fraud. The act made the word “Audit” very popular 
in the firms’ governances, the supervising function turned from a feature to a primarily 
need. 
Reading the second section of the Public Law 107- 204 cited as Sorbanes-Oxley Act, 
we understand the key definitions:  
“AUDIT.—The term ‘‘audit’’ means an examination of the financial statements of any 
issuer by an independent public accounting firm in accordance with the rules of the 
Board or the Commission (or, for the period preceding the adoption of applicable rules 
                                                          
32 http://www.soxlaw.com/ 
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of the Board under section 103, in accordance with then-applicable generally accepted 
auditing and related standards for such purposes), for the purpose of expressing an 
opinion on such statements.” 
“AUDIT COMMITTEE.—The term ‘‘audit committee’ means a committee (or 
equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the 
purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer 
and audits of the financial statements of the issuer; and(B) if no such committee exists 
with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of the issuer.” 
The audit function is recalled immediately in the Act at the Sec. 101, in which the role 
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is explained: “…to oversee the 
audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in 
order to protect the interests of investors…”. The will to create a super partes 
controller is clear in the subsequently statement: “The Board shall not be an agency or 
establishment of the United States Government…”, trying to keep the Board’s 
members immune from political influence, even because how we have seen in the 
scandals above, politicians would have been involved in equivocal relations with the 
fallen companies’ key figures.  
Nonetheless a pro-active control function is contemplated as following: “…conduct 
inspections of registered public accounting firms…”, “conduct investigations and 
disciplinary proceedings concerning, and impose appropriate sanctions where justified 
upon, registered public accounting firms and associated persons of such firms…”. 
If we see the PCAOB and the SEC as external “inspectors”, at the same way we see 
the whole of the firm’s governance subjects as introspective controllers, with the audit 
committee covering the principal junction in the internal audit network. Quoting  Sec. 
204: “Each registered public accounting firm that performs for any issuer any audit 
required by this title shall timely report to the audit committee of the issuer - 
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used; ‘‘(2) all alternative 
statements of financial information within generally accepted accounting 
principles that have been discussed with management officials of the issuer…”and 
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‘‘(3) other material written communications between the registered public 
accounting firm and the management of the issuer, such as any management letter 
or schedule of unadjusted differences.’’  
Therefore all the critical financial information and accounting policies have to pass 
under the audit committee supervision, that allows to reach a more efficacious 
information network, with the scope to find out potential threats at the fount. The 
latter reason and the direct responsibility for the balance statements and accounting 
policies burdened on the CEO and the CFO; making the relation contained within 
“decision-responsibility” mechanism clearer. Accordingly to Sec. 302 “Responsibility 
for financial reports” pass through the admission of the “principal executive 
officer(CEO) or officers and the principal financial officer(CFO) or officers, or 
persons performing similar functions” to certify signing each annual or quarterly 
report that “based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made,… not misleading”.  
Immediately complementary to the responsibility aspect is Sec. 401: “Disclosures in 
periodic reports”. It dictates that all the financial reports have to be prepared following 
the accounting principles according to the SEC ones. The Sec. 401 gives to the 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) the charge to issue the final rules for 
“providing each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed with the 
Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, 
obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer 
with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material current or 
future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of 
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant 
components of revenues or expenses.” The law wants to make stakeholders, minority 
shareholders and the public officers aware about the off-balance data, to better 
understand the company’s dynamics. Keeping on Sec. 401 we can notice another 
main feature about the Act, as matter of fact the SEC powers were considerably 
increased, touching new subjects such as code of ethic. Moreover “the Commission 
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shall issue rules to require each issuer, …, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the 
reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, 
applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting 
officer, or persons performing similar functions”(Sec. 406 Sorbanes- Oxley Act). The 
above mentioned section wants to introduce a new management interpretation, in 
which there is not mandatory restrictions for companies to adopt ethic codes, but 
companies have to explain, why or why not, they have chosen to adopt the ethical 
code.  
But what does code of ethics mean? The definition is included in the same section of 
the Act : “the term ‘‘code of ethics’’ means such standards as are reasonably 
necessary to promote:  - honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of 
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional 
relationships; -  full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the 
periodic reports required to be filed by the issuer; and compliance with applicable 
governmental rules and regulations.” 
Continuing our analysis of the Public Law 107- 204, we must see the most discussed 
section of the Act: “Management assessment of internal controls” (Sec. 404). Basically 
issuers are called to publish information in their annual reports concerning the scope 
and adequacy of the internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. 
Quoting the Sec. 404, the reports shall “state the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for 
financial reporting; and contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal 
year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures 
of the issuer for financial reporting.” Concerning the evaluation of the internal control 
pattern and reporting system, the Act imposes to registered public accounting firms, 
who prepare the audit report for the issuer, to attest the assessment made by the 
management of the issuer accordingly with the PCAOB’s standards.  
Postponing the explanation why Sec. 404 has been judged bad by some studies, we 
move on the last four titles, focused on the crimes and punishments to apply. In 
particular the legislator was driven by the public sense of justice subsequent to the 
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several collapses happened at the dawn of the new millennium. He wanted to embitter 
the penalties for those deplorable malfeasances . Crimes such as the destruction of any 
relevant document for any correct evaluation will be punished heavily. More 
specifically:  ‘‘Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, 
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the 
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of 
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States …, 
or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”(Title 8, Sec. 802 – Sorbanes- Oxley 
Act).  
Title IX “White-Collar crime penalty enhancements”33 responds to the necessity to 
safeguard the market trustable, making the subjects operating in the markets aware 
about the concept of “you do the crime, you serve the (appropriate) time”.  The matter 
needed a determined intervention because of the damages inflicted by owners and 
management bodies to the collectivity and whole society equilibrium, so the hope was 
to restore public confidence in American business, heavily shaken by huge corporate 
scandals.  
For sure the Sorbanes Oxley Act has put a dividing line in corporate laws, the results 
however are not so clear. Mainly we could see two aspects. The former, since the SOX 
act was signed in 2002 by George W. Bush (who called its tough new rules the “most 
far-reaching reforms of American business practices since Franklin Roosevelt was 
president” ), some politicians and business men criticized the real feasibility of the 
code. The reasons were several, top of the list was the price of compliance; the cost of 
implementing SOX’s provisions, particularly section 404, far exceeded the modest 
sums initially predicted. Moreover SOX was accused to undermine the America’s 
entrepreneurial spirit and competitiveness. Barely a year after it became law, William 
Donaldson, then chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), wondered if 
by unleashing “batteries of lawyers across the country” the legislation would lead to a 
“loss of risk-taking zeal” due to a “huge preoccupation with the dangers and risks of 
                                                          
33 Sorbanes Oxley Act 
23 
 
making the slightest mistake”.34 The second aspect was about the above mentioned 
disequilibrium between costs and improvements. 
With the aim to give findings and to prove the concreteness or not of these reprimands, 
I have drawn on the paper “SOX after ten years – A Multidisciplinary review” by 
Professor John C. Coates and Professor Suraj Srinivasan at Harvard Business School. 
The tasks of estimating either the benefits or the indirect costs of the Act are at least an 
order of magnitude more difficult than the task of estimating direct costs. Before 
talking about some data, let’s give a short review about the new hybrid public/private 
body created by the Act: the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  It “is a 
non-profit private corporation charged with the public function of overseeing auditors 
of SEC-registered companies with the goals of protecting investors and the public 
interest in the ―preparation of informative, fair and independent audit reports.  
PCAOB‘s main tasks are to register, set standards for, inspect, investigate, and 
discipline public company audit firms…”35. PCAOB was a consequence of the chose 
not to let the charge to the SEC, nor to the private hands of  the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  
The paper highlights several findings regarding the critics moved to the Act. About 
section 404 , which requires attestation of IC systems, the authors names it as a 
comply or explain regime. Indeed it permits companies to allow IC systems to contain 
weaknesses, as long as that fact is disclosed as part of their own disclosures and by the 
audit firm providing the attestation.  
Significant is the study conducted by Rice, Weber, and Wu (2013), that shows the low 
incentives for timely reporting about internal control weaknesses. They find firms that 
do not report a timely internal control weakness and later have a restatement are in fact 
less likely to have class action lawsuits, SEC sanctions, and management and auditor 
turnover, compared to firms with restatement where the internal control weakness had 
been previously reported. To better understand the effective relevance of that aspect, 
Rice and Weber (2011) find a significant proportion of firms fail to report material 
                                                          
34“Five years under the thumb” – The Economist http://www.economist.com/node/9545905 
35 “SOX after 10 years – A multidisciplinary review” page 4 – J.C. Coates and S.Srinivasan 
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weaknesses when they exist. Only 32.4% of firms that in a second moment made a 
material restatement previously reported a material weakness. That is, most firms did 
not report the IC weakness when it existed, rather reporting it in subsequent and more 
serious reports. The perverse mechanism, that we can glimpse, works as an excuse for 
managers, permitting them to show their unawareness about the weakness of the 
internal control system. However, the SOX 404 in operation, may not allow firms to 
continue to maintain IC systems with weaknesses. Driven by market forces, the issuers 
corrected their IC systems. Johnstone et al. (2011),found it on a sample of 733US 
firms who disclosed material weaknesses  in 2003.36 
The new regulation has shaped the US markets. Making difficult for a lot of firms to 
respect new standards and to face new costs. The congress’ ambition was to improve 
the quality of the public companies operating on the American indexes. 
The following are the findings of several studies on the US firms’ trend. The features 
considered are three: “to go private”, to “go dark”( deregister their common stock and 
thus suspend their SEC reporting obligations), and to go public on US stock markets 
after the SOX was signed. 
 
                                                          
36 SOX after 10 years – A multidisciplinary review” page 14 – J.C. Coates and S.Srinivasan 
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“Going private numbers are from Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007). Going Dark data 
are from Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008).”37 
Actually we have to say that the results should be judged carefully, because of several 
reasons linked to the economic context, that makes a company opting for going private 
or not. For sure, the possibility to do not face the costs of compliance requested by the 
SOX 404 is one reason, but even the mitigation of the conflict between investor 
shareholders (short term oriented) and owner shareholders (long term oriented), and 
the chance to use the debt leverage, are reasonable logics. 
The next figure shows the frequency of IPOs (Initial Public Offer) in the U.S. by small 
(<$50 MM sales) and large firms, by year. The figure is from Gao et al (2013). 
38 
On this graph the authors warns about the meaning of the clear drop in small firm IPOs 
occurred in 2001, before SOX‘s passage. Gao et al., explain that, despite the SEC 
revising rules to reduce compliance costs burden on small companies, and then small 
firms being permanently exempted by Congress in the DoddFrank Act, the number of 
small IPOs has not increased. Gao et al. (2013) attribute the drop-off in IPOs to the 
absence of profitable small companies and technological changes that make economics 
of scope and ability to speed products to markets more important than in the past, 
giving an advantage to larger firms. 
                                                          
37 “SOX after 10 years – A multidisciplinary review” figure 2 – J.C. Coates and S.Srinivasan 
38 “SOX after 10 years – A multidisciplinary review” figure 3 – J.C. Coates and S.Srinivasan 
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Accordingly to the accuses regarding the loss of competitiveness of the American 
corporate law, measurable by the attitude of US body law to attract foreign firms, we 
can give a look to the following graph. The numbers of foreign firms who have listed 
in US over time is the red line, and the number of foreign firms who have delisted over 
time in US is the green line.  
Data from new listings are from Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) and for delistings are 
from Hostak et al (2013).39 
 
It seems clear the loss of attractiveness for foreign firms for the US stock markets, but 
the SOX effect could be read also as a filter for enhancing the quality composition of 
the US indexes. Everyone can interpret these findings with several lecture keys, but I 
am going to push on them toward the direction that validates the following statement:  
through the SOX operation, many firms decided to go dark, go private or do not 
launch their IPOs, because of the costs they would have been faced, if they had have 
wanted to make their IC systems lawful. Somehow, SOX “cleaned” up US regulated 
markets from issuers with inefficient audit attitude, such as a nature selection.  
                                                          
39 “SOX after 10 years – A multidisciplinary review” figure 4 – J.C. Coates and S.Srinivasan 
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Now we are going to face another important provision originated from SOX’s Sec. 
806. The next paragraph is going to expose the whistleblowing mechanism.  
 
Whistleblowing 
Sec.806 “PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY TRADED 
COMPANIES WHO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD” in ‘§ 1514A. “Civil action 
to protect against retaliation in fraud cases” affirms that, for whistleblowers protection 
involving employees of publicly traded companies : “No company…or any officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, 
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an 
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done 
by the employee— ‘‘(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or 
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee 
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 134140, 134341, 134442, or 134843, 
any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of 
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance 
is provided to or the investigation is conducted by— ‘‘(A) a Federal regulatory or law 
enforcement agency; ‘‘(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or 
‘‘(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee…; or ‘‘(2) to file, cause to 
be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be 
filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of section 
1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.” 
Sec. 806 aims to empower the IC system, safeguarding the whistleblower’s normal 
going in the company context.  
Taking a step back let’s see what a whistleblower is.  
                                                          
40 U.S. Code § 1341 - Frauds and swindles 
41  U.S. Code § 1343 - Fraud by wire, radio, or television 
42 U.S. Code § 1344 - Bank fraud 
43 U.S. Code § 1348 - Securities and commodities fraud 
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In the general conception the whistleblower is the employee who notices a possible 
situation (fraud), that could prejudice customers, shareholders, society or the firm’s 
reputation, and for this reason, he decides to signal the situation to internal or external 
offices accountable for control. That makes every employee part of the Internal 
Control system, with no relevance of the covered position in the organizational chart.  
This figure has begun to be an important piece of the puzzle when in the last decades 
several scandals happened. Accordingly to “The Economist”: 
“Whistleblowing has been on the increase since the 2007-08 financial crisis sparked a 
crackdown on corporate corruption and collusion. The number of tips received by the 
“Whistleblower Office” of America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
risen steadily since it was opened in 2011, to nearly 4,000 a year. “We live in the age 
of the whistleblower,” says Jordan Thomas, a former SEC official now at Labaton 
Sucharow, a law firm. Surveys by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, a 
global group for financial sleuths, consistently find tips to be the leading mechanism 
for unearthing wrongdoing, well ahead of audits or regulatory reviews.44 
Could the business cracks have had less catastrophic repercussions if employees had 
reported timely any evidence of the imminent collapse? If yes, the consequent crucial 
question is: Why did not it happen?  
The answer could be found interpreting the context where the convicted firms, we 
talked in the previous chapter, existed (and exists), where companies have often 
punished whistleblowers rather than praised them. A context made of chaos and hazy 
relations between firms’ management and politicians, external auditors and financial 
institutions. The situation breathed at that moment seemed to be normal and familiar 
for every employee, let them overlook some unlawful behaviors. Thus we can easily 
deduce about the importance of the kind of atmosphere companies want to establish, 
letting people interact on an healthy ground.  
                                                          
44 “The age of Whistleblower” (2015) – TheEconomist.com - 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679455-life-getting-better-those-who-expose-wrongdoing-
companies-continue-fight 
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45 
Law, with SOX’s Sec. 806, intends to influence working context, endorsing any 
subject who wants to reveal violations occurred in the firm. Avoiding the common 
consequences adopted by the company  for “telltale”, such as discharging, harassment 
and threats, protecting and incentivizing46 on the other hand. 
However, the line of reasoning is not indisputable. Incentivizing employee to report 
violations to external agencies could turn in troubles,47 involving: serial submitters, 
and the danger that business confidential information spills out from the company.      
It opens new scenarios, in which the convicted part could be the whistleblower. The 
nature of guilt is influenced by the purpose and the document’s confidential character 
disclosed by the whistleblower to external offices or agencies. 
However we have to keep clearly in mind that so far the payoff has been fairly 
balanced by the law, never forget the main aim of the institution: empowering the IC 
system prevent markets’ unexpected awaking consequences.48 
                                                          
45 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679455-life-getting-better-those-who-expose-wrongdoing-
companies-continue-fight 
46 Actually SOX does not consider any financial incentive, but the Dodd Frank does. Accordingly to the latter: 
“whistleblowers who bring violations of securities law, commodities law, or the FCPA to the attention of the 
proper government authorities—the SEC, DOJ, or Commodities Futures Trading Commission—are entitled to 
between 10% to 30% of any government recovery in excess of $1 million.” – “The Dodd-Frank Act's Robust 
Whistleblowing Incentives” (2011) - Forbes.com 
47 “Europeans have debated but so far rejected the idea of American-style bounties. “The mentality here is 
different,” says a London-based lawyer. “The Wild West, bring-me-the-head approach would undermine rather 
than bolster support” for whistleblowers. The SEC has admitted to having a problem with “serial submitters”, 
who file dozens of spurious claims in the hope that one will lead to a payout.” – TheEconomist.com “The age of 
whistleblowing” (2015) 
48 Whistleblowers Who Take Company Documents May Risk Criminal Prosecution” – Forbes.com (2015) - 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/08/13/whistleblowers-who-take-company-documents-may-risk-
criminal-prosecution/ 
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Moving the eye on Italy, we can assert that, such as for IC patterns, whistleblowing is 
still an unknown word in many realties.  
Accordingly to Simon Wolfe et al, “Whistleblower protection Laws in G20 Countries” 
(2014), Italy is labeled as country with no whistleblower law protection, rated badly in 
almost all the aspect analyzed by the paper, with a completely absence of any principle 
(adopted by other international jurisdictions) in the private sector. The study explains 
that rights and opportunities for whistleblowers in Italy have been limited by strong 
cultural factors that discourage reporting wrongdoing committed by others. Only in 
recent years, the public and political debate has advanced. Finally Italy seems to 
recognize the benefits of whistleblowing in the public sector. The first practical 
example is ‘Milan municipal whistleblower system’ established for employees in July 
2012 that seeks to prevent corruption and other wrongdoing. For the private sector 
employees have no specific legal protections. While some private companies have 
introduced whistleblowing procedures in recent years, most of these were established 
to comply with the US SOX Act, which applies to foreign companies registered in the 
USA.  
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49 
However in the last year something has moved: the 2015 anti-corruption law provides 
for the first time an higher degree of protection for whistleblowing, and it enhances 
ANAC (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione) control powers.  
The above mentioned national agency draws the guidelines of the law, with the 
purpose of hindering retaliation, harassment or any behavior with mafia disposition, 
mainly in the public sector.50 With the proper corrections the Italian scene finally 
seems to follow the international principles. For sure it is an important step toward the 
governance efficiency, but we have not effective findings yet,  that could prove the law 
dispositions are completely absorbed by the business real conditions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679455-life-getting-better-those-who-expose-wrongdoing-
companies-continue-fight 
50 “Linee guida in materia di tutela del dipendente pubblico che segnala  illeciti (c.d. whistleblower)” – ANAC.it - 
http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/AttivitaAutorita/AttiDellAutorita/_Atto?ca=6123 
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Chapter 3 – Codes of best practices, CSR and ethical finance 
The phenomena that catches my attention and, maybe deserves more space, is the 
apparent mechanism that makes the markets push companies to solve their IC 
weaknesses or any other lack in the communication process (disclosure) with the 
outsiders. A wide overview about Western countries’ corporate laws, let us think about 
a growing awareness of the market actors. We can affirm that, for example, looking to 
the best practices codes adopted all over the world, and the popularity of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and ethical finance approaches. 
 
Codes of best practices 
Following the UK’s lead(the City of London first issued a corporate governance code 
in 1992), all European jurisdictions have now adopted a corporate governance code 
that draws guidelines for public and listed companies, addressing board composition, 
structure, and operation. It was mainly a consequence after several corporate scandals. 
The codes are drafted by market participants under the watch of a regulatory 
authority.51 It is no mandatory for listed companies to follow these guidelines, but such 
as SOX’s title IV and other jurisdictions like UK, Germany and Italy, companies have 
an obligation to report annually whether they comply with code provisions and, if they 
do not, they have to explain the reasons of their noncompliance. It is known as the 
‘comply-or-explain’ rule. The best practices codes are pretty similar across the several 
jurisdictions, however, they differ on the fact that the codes are embodied in “hard 
laws” (like the Sorbanes Oxley Act), rather than in semi- voluntary codes (like in 
Italy). 
The Italian law frame is constituted by the ‘codice civile’ and the TUF (Testo Unico 
della Finanza). The Codice Civile imposes the structure of the governance and the 
bonds, duties and responsibilities of any subject who interacts with the firm, while the 
TUF rules the operations of issuing or trading any kind of securities on the market. 
These two codes represent the ‘strong’(mandatory) law.  
                                                          
51 “The Anatomy of corporate law” – John Armour, H. Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, page 67 
33 
 
On the other hand, “Il codice di autodisciplina” is the voluntary best practices code 
adopted for public companies in Italy. It was issued in 2006 by the ‘corporate 
governance committee’, and then modified in 2010 and 2014. The code allows listed 
companies to follow, entirely or in part, its dispositions. It remarks the UE 
Recommendation n. 208/2014, involving the ‘management relation’, that has to be in 
compliance with the codes principles, and if not, the issuer (the company) has to 
explain clearly how the reality does not fit the code’s principles.52 
Now we are going to analyze the main points of the code, touching the relevant issues 
able to arise the classical agency problems, shaping a 360° control system, where all 
the members of the company’s governance bodies are involved in a virtuous circle of 
cross-auditing.  
The main role is acted by the Board of Directors that guides the issuer, organizing the 
correct execution of its functions. The directors manage with awareness and 
autonomy, pursuing the creation of value for shareholders in a long-time horizon. 
For the firms who adopt the “Codice di autodisciplina”, the board of directors has to 
judge the quality of the internal control system, and the risk control system at least 
every 3 months. Moreover, it is a board duty, the act of monitoring  the directors 
status, verifying the commitment and professionalism of each board member, with the 
aim of avoiding the overlapping of charges or the lack of presence during the board 
reunions.  The board has to express their evaluation about all possible critic points 
involving its members and committees, clarifying for example:  
 the reasons why the shareholders’ meeting launches the competition prohibition 
exception, art. 2390 C.c.; 
 the role of each member of the board (executive, non-executive and 
independent),  
 the relations existing between the issuer’s governance and  the associates’ and 
subsidiaries’ ones.  
                                                          
52 “Codice di autodisciplina” – Borsaitaliana.it 
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The Article 2 of the “Codice di autodisciplina”, coherently to the international best 
practices, suggests not to concentrate too much power in one subject. More 
specifically, if the CEO is the person who also controls the company, or the president 
of the board, the directors should institute, as counterweight, the figure of the lead 
independent director, who represents the benchmark for the independent directors and 
coordinates their functions. 
The figure of the independent director is one of the more interesting measures in the 
best practices codes. The internal control system, in that way, touches directly the 
composition of the management body. Following as source the Italian voluntary code, 
the independent director is who, neither indirectly, has had any contact or relation with 
the issuer. Obviously the nature of the relation above mentioned, has to be able to arise 
a conflict of interest or a clear influence on the company operation. The independent 
status has to be judged by the board of directors.  
The independent directors’ function is revealed in the nominee committee. The 
nominee committee is the internal agency, composed in majority of independent 
directors, who states opinion on the dimension and composition of the board, and on 
the professional profiles of the directors.  
Historically the nominee committee was thought as counterweight in systems with a 
disaggregated ownership structure, where the shareholders have a limited supervisory 
on management’s actions. However it is a useful tool for high concentrated-share 
systems as well.53 
The discretionary character of the code permits to consider independent a director 
based on other circumstances. For example, the independent director who is nominated 
non-executive director in a subsidiary or in a related company, could not undermine 
the status of independent, keeping clear that his reward should not be tied to connected 
operations between the two firms. At the same way, the independent director who 
owns (directly or not) a certain percentage of shares that does not make him unable to 
control or to influence the company outstandingly, could compromise, de facto, his 
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independency. The corporate governance committee does not prescribe the boundaries 
on commercial, financial and professional relations between independents director and 
related companies neither. In fact, the due to establish the relevance of those relations 
is up the board of directors. The room of maneuver, granted by the code, should push 
the issuer to highlight the conflicts of interests based on contextualized evidences. The 
conflicts of interest are part of the potential threat that harm the IC system, and should 
be kept under control by the “risk control system”. The “Codice di autodisciplina” 
defines the risk control system and nominee committee’s function as help for the 
issuer in the attempt to fit the strategy objectives, fostering aware decision methods. 
The control systems contribute to safeguard the entirety of the social capital, the 
efficacy and efficiency of the company’s processes, the trustable of the financial 
information flow and the law respect. 54 The code gives an overview on the subjects 
involved in the control systems, so they are: 
 The board of directors, with a specific regard for the internal control committee 
and the directors in charge for the committee establishment, 
 the internal audit supervisor, who verify if the internal control system works 
and if it is adequate, 
 other roles with mansion involving the control systems at any operative level, 
and  
 the board of statutory auditors, who verifies the efficacy of the accounting rules 
and of the systems above mentioned. 
The code suggests to coordinate the subjects’ supervisory actions, improving an 
efficient system working on different levels.55  The line controls (or operative 
controls), the management control and the internal audit should be seen as an 
interactive pattern who works for the company’s wealth and integrity. 
As the Italian ‘Codice di autodisciplina’ analysis finishes, we better define the 
range and relevance of the subjects involved, compared two possible market 
configurations, represented by Italy and USA. 
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The Italian public companies’ shareholding is typifying by dominant shareholders. 
Giving a brief look to some data, about the Italian stock market, we can later state 
some considerations about some best practices mechanisms.  
The amount of the Italian listed companies’ capitalization is about €556B56. This 
number alone does not give us an exhaustive frame, but we can say that it is no so 
notable, overall if we compare it to the amount of capitalization of US listed 
companies, $18,668B57. For sure, we can assert that stock market acts a different 
social role in their respective national equilibriums. Another relevant aspect to 
emphasize, if we want to understand the adaptation of the international best 
practices trend, is the nature of the investors in Italy, focusing on the role of the 
private investors (or better, households) that directly characterizes the grade of 
concentrated shareholdings.   
The following graph, gives as the weight of the Italian households presence on the 
Italian markets. 58 
 
However the 18% can be deceptive, in fact we are going to be surprised that only 
the 1.7% of the families’ portfolio is composed by listed companies shares.59 
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We can affirm that the presence of Italian households in listed companies 
shareholdings is marginal beside other realities
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The figure shows the percentage of common stocks in each country that is owned 
directly by households.60 Obviously the different structure of the Italian market 
gives new interpretation on best practices tools.  
Another significant peculiarity of the Italian market is the robust presence of 
families or the only-owner in the firm’s governances. It is explained by the 
companies’ modest dimension that characterizes the average Italian enterprise. 
 61 
In the first row of the figure we have the percentage of the Italian companies 
owned and controlled by families (72.1%), and the companies with no notable 
families’ presence in the governance(27.9%). The second row shows the nature of 
the dominant shareholder in the two several kinds of corporations. The numbers 
drive away any doubt, both columns vaunt an overwhelming existence of families 
or individuals as dominant shareholders, with an average of 89.7% on the total. 
This last feature leads to new considerations about the way best practices affect the 
Italian reality. 
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In particular a research made by Lorenzo Patelli and Annalisa Prencipe at Erasmus 
School of Economics of Rotterdam and Università Bocconi of Milan, studies “The 
Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent Directors in the 
Presence of a Dominant Shareholder” (2007). The paper tests the relationship 
between two control mechanisms (i.e. voluntary disclosure and independent 
directors) within a setting characterized by the presence of a dominant shareholder. 
According to the Agency Theory, both of the mechanisms are able to reduce the 
agency costs arising from the separation between ownership and management. The 
consulted sample, examined in the empirical test, is composed by non-financial 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange (i.e. Borse Italiane). Independent 
directors and voluntary disclosure “can be both internal and external mechanisms: 
the former control and orient managers’ behavior (e.g. corporate governance 
structures or compensation packages); the latter provide information about 
managers’ action to external stakeholders (e.g. financial statements and voluntary 
disclosure)”62. Independent directors are expected to act with the purpose of 
assuring the respect of legality and limiting agency problems, such as the risk of 
collusion of the board members with the CEO (in Italy very often the CEO is also 
the dominant shareholder or a very closed person to him) and reducing occurrences 
of financial statement fraud. On the other hand we have the voluntary disclosure 
that aims “to reduce the agency problem between insiders and outside shareholders 
or lenders, providing information about financial and non-financial results achieved 
by managers. The Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) posits that insiders 
have incentives to provide information about their activities instead of leaving to 
the outside shareholders the task to investigate about them. This is because the 
costs managers to disclose such information (the so-called bonding costs) are lower 
than the costs the principals would bear to control insiders’ activities from outside 
(the so-called monitoring costs).”63 The paper examines a sample of 175 Italian 
non-financial listed corporations. The several analyzed variables are based on 
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firm’s reports and on the composition of the board of directors, keeping the 
awareness of potential gaps between the official and the de facto situations 
unyielding. The conclusion highlights the positive correlation between the number 
of independent directors and amount of voluntary information disclosed by the 
companies in their annual reports. Findings provide support for the study’s 
expectation, that is the internal and the external control mechanisms tend to 
coexist. The most interesting implication, for the present thesis, supported by the 
empirical evidence consisted by the insiders’ behavior “insiders are more willing to 
disclose information that allows a better understanding of their current performance 
when, ex ante, their opportunistic behavior is limited by the monitoring activities 
carried out by the independent directors.”64  
In the following I am going to cite the study’s results paragraph, with the main 
commented statistics: “On average, companies in the sample report 1,822 million 
euro of Total Sales and 0.39 of the Equity to Total Assets ratio (LEV). The average 
Return on Investment (ROI) is 2.21% with 44 (25.7% of the total sample) 
companies reporting a negative operating income…On average, 35.21% of the 
share capital is owned by unknown shareholders (ROWNDIF). The variation in the 
proportion of independent directors reported by the Italian companies is high, 
ranging from 0 to 100%. The average ratio of independent directors to total 
directors on the board (INDIR) is 35.57% ... The median number of independent 
directors sitting on the board is three. Independent directors represent more than 
15% of the members of the board of directors in 158 companies (92.39% of the 
total sample). Eight companies (4.68% of the total sample) declare to have zero 
independent directors; one company declares that all the members of its board of 
directors are independent. Ten companies (5.84% of the total sample) do not 
specify the names of the independent directors. Eighty-three companies (48.5% of 
the total) disclose whether their independent directors sit on other boards. One 
hundred and fourteen out of 308 independent directors with available information 
sit on more than one board. Other studies show that the average number of 
                                                          
64 “The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent Directors in the Presence of a Dominant 
Shareholder” (2007), page 26  – Patelli, Prencipe 
41 
 
independent directors does not dramatically vary over time and across market 
segments (SpencerStuart, 2004). The mean value of DSCORE is 14.66% (median 
¼ 13.77%), with a range of 0.72–47.2% and standard deviation of 7.73%. These 
results show that there is a good variation in voluntary disclosure practices among 
Italian listed companies. On average, companies disclose high volume of 
management information (MNGT) to discuss financial results. However, their 
annual reports contain little projected information (PROJ). Voluntary disclosure 
appears to be concentrated on current financial information as highlighted also by 
the low percentage of non-financial information (NONF). ”65 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
What does ‘sustainability’ mean? “It has been defined as economic development 
that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of 
the future generations to meet their own needs.” 66 For business that includes 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues.  
The concept of CSR stands for  companies commitment to integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions with their 
stakeholders. CSR is generally understood as being the way through  companies 
achieve an economic balance, with environmental and social imperatives, while at 
the same time they pay attention to the expectations of shareholders and 
stakeholders. Most of the times that means a dilemma with no easy solution. 
Corporations have to align their social and environmental activities with their 
business purpose and values. The CSR has to take action from the corporation’s 
culture, it has to be assimilated by the whole structure and it becomes effective 
only if there is coherency with the company’s business strategy.  
A properly implemented CSR concept can bring along a variety of competitive 
advantages, such as “enhanced access to capital and markets, increased sales and 
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profits, operational cost savings, improved productivity and quality, efficient 
human resource base, improved brand image and reputation, enhanced customer 
loyalty, better decision making and risk management processes.”67 
Accordingly to the Harvard Business Review’s article “The truth about 
CSR”(2015) by V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase, and Sohel Karim, there are several 
points of impact or “theaters” that implement multifaceted CSR systems. CSR 
patterns could involve from the pure philanthropy to environmental sustainability 
and the active pursuit of shared value. The examined sample of 142 managers 
reveals that the main purpose is to align the CSR program with the company’s 
values. However the study identifies the most common obstacle to an incisive CSR 
program: that is the lack of actions coordination.   
Aligning CSR programs must begin with an inventory and audit of existing 
initiatives. The theaters above mentioned in the Rangan, Chase and Karim’s article 
are defined as:  
1. Theater one: programs focused on philanthropy, not designed to improve 
directly business performance. 
2. Theater two: working on existing business models, these programs want to 
improve operational effectiveness, through sustainability initiatives 
affecting the value chain, such as reducing resource use, and investing in 
employee working conditions, that may reduce costs or enhance 
productivity and company reputation. 
3. Theater three: maybe the most discussed matter. Programs in theater three 
involve the creation of new forms of business specifically to address social 
or environmental challenges.  
The programs classified in the last point have been in the middle of the debate 
regarding the relation between social welfare and business economic character, 
having on a side the supporters of the classic thought, social matters= costs, and on 
the other side businessmen who say that with the right intuition and caution the 
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economic result is possible to be achieved through CSR systems as well. A good 
example is Hindustan Unilever’s Project Shakti in India. “Instead of using its 
customary wholesaler-to-retailer distribution model to reach remote villages, the 
company recruits village women, provides them with access to microfinance loans, 
and trains them in selling soaps, detergents, and other products door-to-door. More 
than 65,000 women entrepreneurs now participate, nearly doubling their household 
incomes, on average, while increasing rural access to hygiene products and thus 
contributing to public health. These social gains have been met by business gains 
for the company: As of 2012 Project Shakti had achieved more than $100 million 
in sales.”68 As consequence Unilever decides to roll out similar programs in other 
parts of the world.  
Another example is Jain Irrigation, an Indian global drip-irrigation equipment 
supplier. “The company offers farmers microfinance loans to help them purchase 
its equipment, provides technical advice to help them increase productivity, and 
buys their output at guaranteed prices.”69 The business was drawn specifically for 
India’s small and low-income landholders, helping them to reduce the waste and 
use of water, increasing the crop yields. “For a typical investment of $500 per 
hectare, farmers increased their gross income per hectare by anywhere from $500 
to $6,000, depending on their crops. The added value created for its customers 
enabled Jain to boost its top line while retaining its operating profit percentage.”70 
Paradoxically, in economic realities characterized by a low degree of development, 
achieving CSR programs belonging to ‘theater three’ is easier than other more 
advanced realities. That is true because of the underrated potential stood below the 
social surface. 
However, ‘theater three’ programs are achievable in advanced countries as well.   
A European company commits to develop a CSR system is IKEA. Since 2011 
when Steve Howard was hired as CSO (Chief Security Officer), a seven-person 
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executive management group was created. The group sets the company’s vision 
and develops its strategy. Ikea wants to achieve simultaneously the strong growth 
objective and a bold sustainability, along the actuation “of a range of programs 
related  preventing child labor and maintaining other labor standards throughout 
the supply chain.”71 
Once we have identified the economic character in theater three, we should give 
the reason why, the others two theaters (with no certain way to gauge the direct 
results) are still a good investment for managers. Businessmen who agree with the 
nowadays trend would answer that the clearest advantage is the gain in company’s 
image. However that it is true only within a market with high levels of social 
awareness.  
Just give a look the findings in the Rangan, Chase and Karim’s survey. 
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72 
To endorse the statement in the previous page, we can give a brief look to another 
survey, conducted in 2015 by Nielsen titled “Global survey of corporate social 
responsibility”. The percentage of consumers sensitive to sustainability matters is 
growing all around the world. The economic effect is tied to the willingness for 
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consumers to pay a premium price for products branded by companies that pay 
attention to ethical and social matters. 
73 
The Italian numbers are below the world average, but in strong growing. The 52% 
of Italian consumers say to be sustainability-concerned in 2015 (45% in 2014 and 
44% in 2013), and the structure of the Italian CSR landscape, encompassed by big 
firms (with more than 100 employees) that invest in social matters in Italy is the 
following. 
  74 
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Gleaning from the Michael Porter’s vocabulary, we might say that the macro 
environment, where firms and stakeholders75 exist, is going to be affected by new 
forces, capable to change the firm’s attitude to make profit.  
 
Ethical Finance 
In this paragraph my intention is to show the origin of a new conception of finance, 
derived from the recent scandals. We are going to complete our analysis regarding 
the measures that an aware management can adopt if it wants to set up its firm with 
ethical character.  So, let’s see what the Social Responsible Investment (SRI) is, 
and what does it concern.   
The notoriety of  the Social Responsible Investments  grows every year all over the 
world, and provide new sources of credit,  and new opportunities to develop 
profitable businesses  for companies who fit some “ethical” standards. Before we 
begin our analysis, it is correct to have an idea about how the finance world has 
worked so far, throughout the role of the banks, and why a lot people believe that 
“ethical finance” is just an oxymoron. 
The world financial crisis occurred in 2008 pushed the capitalism in a chasm 
difficult to overcome. It began in the United States with the subprime mortgage 
crisis, and then it has spread all over the World. In the later years the crisis has 
gathered several study points, that draw a general explanation. First of all, it’s out 
of doubt the lack of control about the control agencies, who has undervalued the 
resorting to securitization; that is, the attitude to transform assets in securities 
making the markets more volatile, riskier, and, as a fact, making money more 
expensive. This is the first junction. It helps us to make a basic distinction existing 
in the credit system: the separation in the finance world, based on the banks’ 
operative nature. So we have: the commercial bank, and the investment bank. The 
former has the reason of its existing in lending money to its customers for an 
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interest; the latter mainly trades any kind of securities on stock markets. That 
separation is more evident in the US reality, where there are banks specialized in 
one or in the other function.  
The trigger that caused the crisis was pulled at the end of the 1999 and the 
beginning of the new millennium, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act were signed, shaping the American 
financial scenario. The president of the Federal Reserve, at that time, Laurence 
Meyer talked about the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as a “Fed-light”76 disposure. It let 
the FED as supreme supervisor, but limited its activity on the financial system. The 
following year, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act deregulated the 
derivatives trading. More specifically, the amendment created a law gap 
concerning the lack of control on the Credit Default Swap(Cds) trading. The Cds 
are private contracts between two counterparts where they “bet” on their debtors’ 
risk of default.77 It was the first step toward the overuse of the securitization, the 
new way to do bank. Moreover the SEC in 2004, applied the not-mandatory 
program called “Consolidated Supervised Entities Program” (CSE). It allowed to 
investment banks to have more autonomy in technical valuations, such as fix the 
capital reserves and a less restricted disclosure policy on several securities trading. 
The program mentioned above, however, was accepted by the principal American 
investment banks, letting the financial interaction flow just between the investment 
banks’ senior managers and the SEC’s staff.78 
Finance was getting less real and based on assets with very volatile market value. 
At the same time in the second half of the 2000s’, particular kind of rewards 
addressed to top management began to grow exponentially: the stock options. To 
tie the top management’s reward to the firm’s performance represent an important 
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leverage in business, but with no wisdom it could turn into a dangerous tool. It was 
absolutely true in our case. Rich bonuses and dividends made Investment bank’s 
top management mouth water. They oriented their strategies to short term results, 
making the pattern even more unsustainable. After 2005 with even less quality 
debts, American investments banks pushed the investor’s risk over the limit, that 
meant heavy losses when the system collapsed in 2008, and besides, as social 
aftermath, it enhanced the economic difference among the several social classes.79 
The crisis spread all over the world, highlighted limits in ex ante controls, able to 
avoid the fall, and ex post measures as well. The first response was “Basilea 3”, in 
which the main aim was to assure an “adequate patrimony” for a better risk facing.  
However, the fundamental issue does not seem linked to a mere reserve limit. I 
would want to pay attention on the reasons why, especially during the last crisis,  
ethical approaches to finance have begun to gather a growing consensus among 
financial professionals and not.  
I follow the belief that ethics is an useful tool to contrast the capitalism’s dark 
sides, such as corruption and pathological speculation. These economy 
imperfections lead to resources dissipation, making the economic sustainable 
development mere utopia. The way to do ethical finance keeps all the traditional 
patterns and calculations, but it implements the relation “investment – yield ” with 
another variable, concerning the reflexed effect on the real economy. The 
discussion rests on the possibility to have concrete advantages in the market. 
Actually the concept is not so innovative, ethical finance lays on the classic idea 
that all financial entities should support the efficient transfer of assets from 
individuals in surplus to individuals in deficit.80 
The new conception of finance respects the environment and the human being in 
economic and social dimension, trying to catch profitable opportunities as well. It 
is a fact, the ill-fated repercussions, that we are living in, represent costs for 
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everyone. Corruption and pollution today bring profit to someone, but, they bring 
to inefficiency and give less business opportunities to everyone tomorrow. Just 
looking at some real scenarios, I feel to take as example the situation of the 
Southern regions of Italy, where the bad management and quality of financial 
flows, the bureaucracy maze and the lack of facilities81 have not advanced the 
condition to get loans for local entrepreneurs, who are discouraged because of the 
limited profitable investments. Some Asian situations are notable as well. The fast 
development of the last decades, involving the absolute absence of sustainable 
concern, shows us a reality with economic conveniences, but unlivable cities.82 
During the 70’s we had in the USA the first examples of financial funds with 
ethical nature. The Pax World Fund excluded from its portfolio any firms involved 
in arms, alcohol and tobacco. Contextualizing the Pax World Fund’s birth, we have 
to say that the principle reason because of its creation was the response to the new 
feeling of American people about the atrocity of the Vietnam War, and the well-
known social fights. In Europe, mainly in the Northern Countries, ethical funds 
appeared  in Great Britain in 1984. The Friends Provident Stewardhip Fund was the 
first ethical fund. In the same years, German people began to feel the pollution 
issue, indeed several investments were addressed to recycling and environmental 
sectors. In Italy ethical finance experiments began in the 70’s, with the MAG 
(Mutue per l’Autogestione). MAG’s objective was to grant resources to people, 
who were not able to achieve bank system standards, and who proposed feasible 
social impacted projects. The MAG development continued until the 1991, when 
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some legislative acts were signed.83 However on the MAG example, the idea of a 
new Ethical Bank started. In 1994, 22 no profit organizations created the “Verso la 
banca etica” association, that turned into a cooperative one year later. In 1999 
Banca Popolare Etica was effective, and in the same year its capital was lire 17,3 B 
(about €9M) with 13.000 associates.84 
Banca Etica’s functions have been highlighted in the recent years, basically thanks 
to some politicians’ concerns and professional opionions. The phenomena was not 
known only in Italy. As a fact, ‘The Economist’ in 2013 wrote about it: “Ethical 
banks are nothing new, but Banca Etica takes its name seriously. Its annual report 
calls for a citizens’ revolt against casino finance, the use of tax havens and 
speculation in commodities. Executive pay is not allowed to exceed six times the 
lowest wage at the bank. And it does not want to get involved with anything having 
to do with pornography, oil or arms (a rule that even applies to shareholders: the 
directors’ report raised concerns that two, Banca Popolare di Milano and Banca 
Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna, are now on a list of banks related to arms 
production and sales). Such ideas may explain why Banca Etica is small: it has 
only 17 branches, around 230 staff and loans of less than €1 billion ($1.3 billion), 
and made a profit of €1.6m in 2012. The firm provides mainly credit to the non-
profit sector and green businesses. It was, for instance, the first Italian bank to lend 
to co-operatives of young people who farm land confiscated from the Mafia. Yet 
Banca Etica has attracted a broad range of shareholders. They number 38,400, of 
which 5,900 are firms, including 83 financial institutions. By some measures, it is 
among Italy’s best-run banks: only 0.4% of loans are in default and only 4.9% of 
loans are classified as “problematic”. And its managers seems inventive. They have 
set up a platoon of 24 travelling bankers to drum up business in areas far from its 
branches.”85 
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The numbers in Italy still show a phenomena active in a market niche, but the trend 
is remarkable. In Europe between 2007 and 2009, so during the crisis rise, the 
financial resources invested in a “sustainable way” increased by 87%, passing from 
€2.700B to €5.000B,86  in which about €1.200B were invested following the 
Eurosif criteria of “Core SRI”, the criteria before mentioned involved a process of 
selectivity of the target customers regarding their ethical profile. It means: no arms 
industries, no nuclear energy producers, selecting all the firms and the States with 
virtuous governance and social policies. Following the Morningstar and Vigeo’s 
Report “Green, Social and Ethical funds in Europe” (2010)87, in Europe the 
number of ethical funds has grown from 683 to 879, and the value of funds’ 
managed assets is about  € 76B.  
Besides financial services customers are more absorbed about the destination of 
their money. In Britain accordingly the findings of a survey conducted by 
Abudance , an ethical investment platform, 70% of people don’t want their money 
invested in unethical businesses and 65% think corporate tax avoidance is unethical  
– more than those who think pornography or arms dealing is unethical.88 
The report says that when people are aware about  “98% of the FTSE 100 (the 100 
companies most capitalized in London Stock Exchange) engages in corporate tax 
avoidance as standard business practice,” 65% of those surveyed consider this 
corporate practice unethical, second only to child labor and human rights abuses.  
Far from being disengaged, 70% of those surveyed want to be in control of where 
their money is invested and choose exactly where it goes. But only 35% of people 
surveyed think that their bank is transparent about where their money is invested. 
We need to say that response is always influenced by the way the question is asked, 
but we have to admit that something is changing in companies’ governances. 
Accordingly to a report made by PwC 62% of all FTSE 100 companies now 
                                                          
86   “Dalla crisi finanziaria alle opportunità della finanza etica” pag.16 – Prof. Maria Cristina Quirici – Università 
di Pisa 
87 “Dalla crisi finanziaria alle opportunità della finanza etica” pag.17 – Prof. Maria Cristina Quirici – Università di 
Pisa 
88 “An 'Ethics Gap' Between Financial Services And Its Customers”(2015) – Forbes.com - 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dinamedland/2015/06/08/an-ethics-gap-between-financial-services-and-its-
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disclose information about their approach to taxation, compared with less than a 
third two years ago.89 Indeed we could suppose that firms do not want to disappoint 
their customers, or better the social opinion, because of its likely capability to 
influence directly and indirectly the company’s revenues. The direct way is 
obvious related to the firm’s sales. More uncertain is, rather, the relation with the 
financial channels. If a certain cut of financial resources available for everyone, in 
the past, is now moving in a new market, where just few companies are allowed to 
stay because of ethical implications, it is mathematical the reduction of financial 
channels for companies who are not in the “ethical market”. The point is, how does 
the “ethical market” have a bearing on corporate governance’s strategies? 
The answer to the question is still ambiguous. The easiest way to try to guess future 
evolutions is to follow the trend, given by numbers. As we have seen in this 
paragraph, overall during the crisis, in which the financial services faced a brutal 
stop, only ethical funds improved their market share. Social awareness perhaps 
boosted financial subjects to do SR investments.  
The main message to get, could be synthetized by the last findings of the 
Abudance’s survey mentioned above. It shown “that 70% of those surveyed want 
to invest in things “that give a good return and don’t harm our future” and 70% ” 
would be unhappy if they discovered their money was invested in unethical 
businesses.”90  
If we want to believe to this market’s growing concerning feeling, we can deduce 
that: if the actors of the financial system adopt ethical standards for their financial 
flows’ strategies, not only they face new financing opportunities, but they avoid to 
stumble upon unexpected findings that lead to stakeholders’ disappointment. It 
means beginning a cycle of trust and loyalty. According to the several Frederick 
                                                          
89 “More transparency in tax reporting” – Pwc.co.uk - http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/tax/insights/more-
transparency-in-tax-reporting.html 
90 “An 'Ethics Gap' Between Financial Services And Its Customers”(2015) – Forbes.com - 
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Reichheld’s studies (Bain & Company), business oriented to investor loyalty, 
generates superior results compared to those engendering disloyalty. 
 
 
The bad little four - Banca Etruria, CariChieti, CariFe and Banca Marche’s case 
The most recent Italian financial scandal involves four little credit institutions 
(together the banks weight the 1% on the Italian National system in assets 
terms.)91. At the end of November mass media began to talk about the disastrous 
financial status of the banks above mentioned. That was not the first time, in which 
Italy has seen banks suffer. It happened to Monte Paschi di Siena in 2012. The 
oldest world bank was rescued issuing a bond emission of about €3,9B, entirely 
signed by the National Treasury, with an interest rate of 9%92.  
The fact trigged a debate about the decency of saddling the State with banks’ 
liabilities; the procedure commonly defined as “bail-out”. The debate culminated 
with the new EU directives in 2013, concerning the concept of the “burden 
sharing”, in which shareholders and conditional bondholders have to be responsible 
for their bank’s debts. On January 1st  2016, the frame was completed. The EU 
directive about the «bail-in» began to be effective, giving a clear sequence of 
subjects accounted for bank’s obligations. The top names on the responsibility list 
are shareholders, followed by conditional bondholders, creditors, and bank deposit 
holders with more than € 100,000 on their account. 
The bail-in reform was effective just in part during the credit institution re-
balancing plan at the end of December 2015. In fact the Italian government, 
keeping in mind the EU directive of 2013, exposed the rebalancing plan based on 
the “burden sharing” mechanism. Moreover contemplating a scenario of switching 
                                                          
91 “Popolari e good bank, parte il risiko” (2015) – Il Sole24ore - http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-
12-29/popolari-e-good-bank-parte-risiko-
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between a good bank, made up of the healthy assets, managed by a resolution fund 
supervised by Banca d’Italia and financed through several credit lines of the 
biggest Italian credit institutes: Intesa , Unicredit and Ubi; and a bad bank: as a 
mixture of all the suffering credits, that will be sold to special subjects specialized 
in managing those kind of assets.93 
The saddest aftermath, however was for the conditional bondholders, mainly 
represented by little money savers. Most of them faced heavy losses. The Italian 
Government decided to establish the “Fondo di Solidarietà”, financing by € 100M 
coming from the “Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi”. The goal of the fund 
was to limit the economic damages the subordinated bondholders coped with, 
refunding some of them.   
Furthermore the public opinion was even more dismayed facing the numbers, 
information and features found out during the following investigation.  
The controversy deals with the bondholders nature of unawareness. They claim 
about the way they signed most of the accused titles. The technique that seemed to 
be used by banks’ employees consisted in not explaining with enough clearness the 
characteristics of the contracts to their customers. So far, nothing was proved for 
sure, even the sly essence of the bargaining, but numbers occurred in the bank 
chronicles can give us a fair point of view: on October 30th 2013 Banca Etruria 
issued a conditional bond loan with a yield of 5%, while Banca Intesa (one of the 
biggest Italian banks) issued a title with the same characteristics with an effective 
yield of 6.75% addressed to institutional investors. That time the BTPs’ yield was 
4.18%(State risk free bond). In April and July 2012 the same happened for 
CariChieti; it issued two bond loans with a yield of 5%, while UniCredit paid, in 
2012, for the same kind of title respectively 7.21% and 7.41%.94 What do those 
numbers mean? 
                                                          
93 “Scatta il piano salva-banche. «Niente fondi pubblici». Operazione da 3,6 miliardi” (2015) – Il Sole24ore - 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/finanza-e-mercati/2015-11-22/ok-governo-piano-salva-banche-nessun-
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94 “Quei bond subordinati con rendimenti da BTp: tassi bassi per titoli a rischio” – Dec 15th 2015 – Il Sole24ore  
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The assertion we can pronounce with no fear is:  those titles were out of any market 
logic, out from reality. Underwriters risked a lot, receiving back an inappropriate 
yield. It means, no warning light for bank customers in the moment they subscribed 
the bonds.  
Naturally it is out of the controversy the underwriters responsibility about their 
actions, consisting in lack of preparation during the valuation process about the 
mechanism behind those financial papers, but equally true, some faded behaviors 
that have taken place along banks organization charts made the gap between the 
‘principal’ and the ‘agent’ even more divergent. 
Examining the way the credit institutions managed their credit granting policy, we 
can glimpse a possible explanation of their need to allocate unprofitable bonds on 
the market. Accordingly to the investigations, the banks’ governances did not pay 
attention to the loan beneficiary selection. The due diligence were supplanted by  
personal connections, the capability of paying back by estate warranties. 
Substantially banks bestowed money with absence of mind.  
Looking back to the Banca d’Italia inspectors’ report about Etruria financial 
position of 2009 (before the Italian financial crisis peak), default credits amounted 
to 14% of the total loans, more specifically € 408.2M of suffering credits, €421.6M 
of credits with critical probability to be redeemed, €132M of expiring credits (not 
refunded yet), and expected losses for € 318.3M.95 But the most notable number 
was represented by the gap of valuation with the Etruria financial sheets. For 
Etruria’s board of directors, suffering credits were just €235M and the expected 
losses €57.7M. Since 2009 Banca Etruria’ governance began to ignore any 
vigilance communications. In 2013 about the 30% of the credits portfolio was bad. 
At that moment the board of directors decided to hide partially the crisis buying 
Btp (Italian State Bonds). In that way they tried to hence revenues through bonds 
negotiation, keeping the intermediation margin high. At the end of 2013 the Btp 
were about € 7B. The losses in the Etruria’s balance sheet was about €73 M, but 
                                                          
95 “Etruria, ecco il primo verbale di Bankitalia: già nel 2009 aveva un miliardo di crediti malati” - Jan 7th 2016 – 
Il Sole24ore 
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without the Btp trading operations the losses would have been about €200 M. Later 
Banca d’Italia criticized Banca Etruria for the excessive presence of Btps in its 
portfolio,so imposed to Tuscan bank to lighten the finantial position of about € 2 B 
of Italian bonds. Banca Etruria was already on the way of a financial instability, but 
for a while the governance misled the market. In 2014 after the balance sheet were 
purified by the Btp, the capital value was of just € 500M, below the vigilance 
limit.96 Only on the 1st July 2015, after the third inspection leaded by Banca 
d’Italia, Banca Etruria entered in controlled administration. 
Accusations were moved mainly to the governance (in which Italian Minister 
Boschi’s father, Pier Luigi Boschi was part of the board of directors since 2011), 
responsible for cooking books and omission of interest conflict to the control 
officers.  
Accordingly to “codice civile”’s  art.2391, directors have the obligation to inform   
and clarify, adequately, any conflict of interest involved in company’s operations 
to the auditors. After the deliberation, the board has to motivate the reasons why 
the conflict has no impact on the operation. At the same way the law allows 
directors who do not vote for, to impugn the deliberation in 90 days.  
Directors who omit the conflict are accounted for any damage caused to the 
company and risk from one to three years of jail.97  
Etruria’s ex-president and CEO, respectively Giuseppe Fornasari and Luca Bronchi 
justified their position stating that the reason why of the Etruria’s financial 
situation was the result of the credit market contraction, and that CEO’s 
responsibilities fit just in part with the accusation.98 
At the same way Consob seemed to have responsibilities too, because of their 
insufficient vigilance on the subordinated bonds trading. 
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The legal process will continue for a while, shaping again the face of Italian (and 
European) corporate law. Any conclusion or opinion expressed on these facts 
would be premature, maybe. For sure it is another example of how a criminal and 
unethical management policy can affect the profitability of a business (bank, 
commercial company, or whatever) and the whole society. 
 
Conclusions  
Basically the text is not going to offer an absolute formula for achieving better 
results in business. It is not going to prove that ethical and respectful enterprises 
accomplish top goals neither.  
The analysis has just seen the developments occurred to corporate laws (and more 
generally, to western societies) after some business crisis, highlighting that, even if 
those crucial events happened in different places in the World, they have in 
common some basic elements. The causes, with different tones, had their origin 
into the agency problem mitigation imbalance.  We can assert that the law context 
has always reacted, trying to draw a law frame capable to avoid that analogous 
imbalances occurred again.  
The US legislative system seems to be more advanced, compared to other realities. 
The implementation and  introduction of all the countermeasures examined before, 
largely, have stars and stripes matrix. So far, the most significant legislative 
intervention is the Sorbanes Oxley Act, signed in 2002, as direct consequence of 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. The SOX mainly contemplates: 
 a new regulator for the accounting industry: the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board(PCAOB); 
 restrictions for external auditors assignments (avoiding that the issuer could 
have any other bond with the audit firm) 
 incentivizing cross-control patterns (involving mandatory quarterly reports, 
clarifying actors responsibilities and instituting internal control offices ) 
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 enhance punishments for who commits any infraction. 
The Act has not impeded other frauds happen, but for sure it has given the basis to a 
new stream to follow for other jurisdictions. 
On the other Atlantic side, Europe has come through a process of legislative 
harmonization. The actions started in the north of Europe (in England first), late 
spreading in the rest of the Old Continent.  
In Italy, likewise everything else, the adaptation to the EU’s law trends came in a 
second moment. As we have seen in the paragraph regarding the whistleblower, only 
in the last 5 years the office became known in Italy, and only in 2015 with the ‘anti-
corruption law’, for the first time the Italian Government provided official protection 
for whistleblowers. 
However, law arrangement and enforcement still cannot achieve the main goal, to 
mitigate the agency problem, that is reducing the moral hazard and the informative 
asymmetry. So, the whole subtle thread has brought me to state that:  we can glimpse, 
in every law reinforcement, the legislator willingness to implant the roots of a virtuous 
context, in which ethical behaviors thrive, that goes along every step of the business 
continuous.  
Examples of that have been shown in the second part of this thesis, in particular we 
have looked to several  means developed on the society need to react, giving a new 
and worthwhile way for people who do choose a sustainable management orientation. 
As all the theories, in their first practical approaches, we cannot prove yet, their 100% 
effectiveness, but there are positive clues.  
Corporate Social Responsibility systems can bring competitive advantages, like: 
enhanced access to capital and markets, increased sales and profits, operational cost 
savings, improved productivity and quality, efficient human resource base, improved 
brand image and reputation, enhanced customer loyalty, better decision making and 
risk management processes. Studies and business realities has shown that profitable 
results are achievable. New reasons and concerns shape the costumer’s preferences, 
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underwriting best practices codes most of times represents just a minimum compliance 
to remain competitive on the market, and building righteous social network within the 
firm makes the competences spread out. 
Another present issue concerns the financial crisis, the even more expensive cost of 
getting loans on the credit market, and the growing percentage of the credits in default 
has put the financial systems on the edge.  
It is simple to understand that, for a good business becomes imperative to gain all the 
financial channels it can. Getting desirable and fitting particular credit institutes’ 
standards we talked before, can mean have an extra card to play. We have said that 
even people, want to invest money with foresight, in profitable businesses with 
contained risk. The Italian shiny example of Banca Etica should make us think on it: 
Banca Etica has less than 5% of “problematic” credit, and just 0.4% of credits in 
default.  
All the legislative intervention would like to push toward a viable direction, but it is 
only feasible if a sustainable management way is adopted. 
The data and graphics reported in the earlier chapters let us assume that there are 
fruitful opportunities to catch in the sustainable management. As all the investments 
directed to change the basis of our business, CSR systems required a cost is paid and a 
medium-long timeline to yield the return.  
In the opinion arisen from my interpretation of the implicit scope of the law 
developments, from my study path and my experience in the US, I feel to state that 
beyond the ethical implications of this new way to do business, there are real 
opportunities for the future. A future where economic advantages shall be originated 
by sustainable choices, that create value not only for shareholders, but for all the 
stakeholders who interact, directly or indirectly, with our business. 
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“In matters of style, swim with the current, in matters of principle, 
stand like a rock”  Thomas Jefferson 
“Amare sì, impazzire mai”  Arturu u Saiuolu 
 
Si chiude la mia esperienza universitaria. La reputo come un passaggio 
importantissimo della mia vita, durante il quale ho immaginato tante volte cosa e come 
questo benedetto foglio di carta possa aiutarmi a costruire una vita, ma questo giorno 
rappresenta solo la consacrazione di tutto ciò per cui ho già buttato le basi. Spero il 
futuro possa portarmi tante nuove avventure, che condividerò come sempre con tutti 
voi. 
Il primo grazie non può non andare ai miei genitori che mi hanno sempre appoggiato e 
motivato, concedendomi la libertà di scegliere, e cosa non da poco, grazie per avermi 
sostenuto finanziariamente. Ringrazio Mamma per l’amore incondizionato. E’ come se 
fosse stata con me a Pisa tutti i giorni, facendomi da cuoca, medico e psicologa tutti i 
giorni. Ringrazio Papà, che rappresenta l’ideale di uomo che vorrei diventare, di cui 
ammiro caparbietà, intelligenza, imprenditorialità. Grazie per essere il mio allenatore 
di vita. Spero di ripagare un giorno il vostro investimento.  
Un grazie alle mie sorelline. Elena che è sempre stata la mia gemella, sicuramente più 
diligente e organizzata. Tutte le volte che chiedo consiglio, dice sempre la cosa giusta. 
Rebecca, che per me rimane sempre la piccola di casa, a cui si può perdonare tutto. La 
più talentuosa dei tre. 
Un grazie a tutta la mia famiglia, che ha rallegrato sempre i miei ritorni a casa. Con un 
grazie particolare ai miei nonni. A mio nonno Arturo vorrei dire che spero di onorare 
al meglio il suo nome, con l’augurio di essere un giorno felice quanto lo fosse lui. Un 
grazie a mia nonna Elena, di bontà assoluta. Un grazie a Nonno Fortunato, di cui ho 
sfoggiato gli insegnamenti nel Poker con i miei amici a Pisa. Grazie a Nonna Cenzina, 
di bellezza Hollywoodiana (significhe ca si bella cumu l’attrici di film), che per la 
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seconda volta è qua a Pisa. Grazie a tutti i miei zii e cugini. Con un grazie particolare a 
Patrick, Alex, Antonio, Giada e Giuseppe u comparu. 
Un grazie di cuore a tutti i miei amici da ‘Mantia, con i quali ho condiviso tante delle 
mie avventure (non basterebbe un libro per raccontarle tutte), e che sono qua anche 
oggi per scrivere un’altra pagina della nostra amicizia che non conosce confini 
geografici o clessidre. Grazie a Renato, Matteo, Marco, Maurizio, Rito, Twister, Botti, 
Rocco, Pasqualino, Daniele, Maruzzu, Gianluca, Claudio, Alez, Luca, Francesco e 
Antonio. Le mie amiche Rossella, Vanessa, Floriana, Gioia, Gessica e Ilenia. Grazie ai 
miei amici ormai ventennali: Francesco Nac e tutta Coreca Beach. 
Ringrazio tutti i miei amici Pisani, che in molti casi di Pisano hanno solo il domicilio. 
Un grazie ad Antonio Sanna che è per me un fratello. Grazie a Loccy grande amico e 
datore di lavoro. Un grazie a tutta la ciurma delle scorribande notturne: Mimmo, Nello, 
Naso, Sacc, Bruno, Matilde, Sabrina, Valerio e De Luca. Un grazie ai miei colleghi, 
soprattutto gli storici Rosalia, Totino, Senatore e Schinella. Un grazie a tutti i miei 
tantissimi coinquilini, con i quali ho stretto un bellissimo rapporto. Con particolare 
riferimento allo sregolato Danny; ai miei mentori Pandino e Ciccio R; alla mia 
versione buona Ludovico; al mio pupillo Mangione, all’americano Francesco e allo 
psicopatico Paolino.  Un grazie alle praticamente coinquiline Sofia, Beatrice e a 
Riccardo il transalpino. Grazie a Zappa e Franci per la loro finezza.  
Un grazie ad Elisa, che mi ha dato tranquillità in un momento importante della mia 
vita e che sa già che mi vergogno a scrivere di più. Te le dico a voce le cose va bene lo 
stesso? Cacciavite. 
Thank to my friends, from all over the world, who share with me the amazing dream 
of California. You make me feel like an actor in an American tv-series, such as “The 
O.C.”, “Beverly Hills 90210” or “Smallville” . Thank you to Adrey, Sheker, Jessica, 
Kerstin, Lee, Sharon, Oshea, Tasha, Adam, Amir, Alexandria, Becca, Laura, Clarisse, 
Yasmin, Beth,  Paola, Cory, Cameron and Khalet. I have wonderful memories, I hope 
to see you soon. 
